The  Ninth Circuit\u27s Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Cases: How Long Is the Arm of California Courts in Reaching Foreign Defendants by Lyon, Christopher
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review Law Reviews
3-1-1995
The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Personal
Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Cases: How
Long Is the Arm of California Courts in Reaching
Foreign Defendants
Christopher Lyon
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Lyon, The Ninth Circuit's Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in Intellectual Property Cases: How Long Is the Arm of California
Courts in Reaching Foreign Defendants, 15 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 661 (1995).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/elr/vol15/iss3/6
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY CASES: HOW LONG IS THE ARM
OF CALIFORNIA COURTS IN REACHING
FOREIGN DEFENDANTS?
I. INTRODUCTION
In Roth v. Garcia Marquez,1 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that a federal district court in the Central District of California properly
asserted personal jurisdiction in an action brought by a California film-
maker against an alien author, a resident of Mexico, as well as the author's
agent, a citizen and resident of Spain.2 In the process, the Ninth Circuit
announced a "dangerously low" threshold for establishing personal
jurisdiction against foreign defendants dealing with American citizens in the
motion picture industry.3  Then, only two years later in Rano v. Sipa
Press, Inc.,4 the Ninth Circuit held that the co-owner of a photographic
distribution syndicate, a citizen of Turkey and long-time resident of France,
was not properly subject to personal jurisdiction in federal court in
California.5 By doing so, the court turned a blind eye towards its previous
efforts in Roth, and re-established what appears to be a more rational and
common-sense approach to personal jurisdiction in actions involving
intellectual property and foreign defendants. Since Rano made no mention
of the Roth decision, however, Roth's strength as precedent in this area is
potentially uncertain.
This Comment will explore the inter-relationship between the Roth
and Rano decisions and, further, will explore the effects of those two
decisions on personal jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit. Part II of this
1. 942 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1991).
2. Id. at 618-19.
3. William A. Daniels, Sr., Note, Roth v. Garcia Marquez: Fitting Motion Pictures with
International Shoes, 13 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. 353, 353 (1993).
4. 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993).
5. Id. at 583, 589.
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Comment will begin by articulating the law of personal jurisdiction in the
Ninth Circuit, specifically in California. Part II will detail the facts of
Roth v. Garcia Marquez and Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc. Part IV of this
Comment will then apply the law of personal jurisdiction to both cases, and
will reconcile their disparate results. Finally, with an eye towards other
circuits, this Comment will predict the future of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence in the Ninth Circuit, with California as the focus of the
analysis.
IH. THE LAW OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction is a puzzling and problematic doctrine which
continues to confuse first year law students, not to mention numerous
litigants, judges, and legal scholars. The "obvious lack of clarity in the
area" of personal jurisdiction has even led to criticism of the United States
Supreme Court's reasoning in terms such as "'imponderable,' 'arbitrary,'
'muddled' or 'grounded in faulty logic."' 6 Personal jurisdiction has also
led to abundant litigation. "[Als of April 14, 1993, at least 19,043 cases
heard [in] federal district courts ... involved ... personal jurisdiction."7
Therefore, it is useful to review the general principles of the law of
personal jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit.
A. Definitions and Standards
"Personal jurisdiction, sometimes referred to as in personam
jurisdiction, is simply the power of the court over the defendant's person.
Absent personal jurisdiction, a court lacks the power to issue an in
personam judgment. ' 8 Personal jurisdiction is, in essence, a "necessary
predicate" before a court can hear the merits of a claim.9 Moreover, even
if a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of jurisdiction prior to trial, the
plaintiff is still required to "prove personal jurisdiction at trial by a
preponderance of the evidence."1
6. Mona A. Lee, Comment, Burger King's Bifurcated Test For Personal Jurisdiction: The
Reasonableness Inquiry Impedes Judicial Economy and Threatens a Defendant's Due Process
Rights, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 945, 945 (1993) (citations omitted).
7. Il at 945 n.2.
8. Daniels, supra note 3, at 359 (citations omitted).
9. Lee, supra note 6, at 945.
10. Trump v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., 857 P.2d 740, 744 (Nev. 1993) (citing Rano v.
Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 587 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993)). See also Ortiz v. Wilmington Trust Co.,
No. Civ. No. 91-00573-DAE, 1992 WL 474579, at *1 (D. Haw. June 2, 1992) ('The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts which substantiate the
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The Ninth Circuit's standard of review for personal jurisdiction, where
the underlying facts are undisputed, is de novo." However, a district
court's finding of personal jurisdiction is reversible only upon a showing
that the finding is clearly erroneous. 2 The appellant must bear the burden
of establishing a prima facie case for reversing the determination below.
1 3
B. General Versus Specific or Limited Jurisdiction
The Ninth Circuit has interpreted International Shoe v. Washington,4
the seminal Supreme Court decision on personal jurisdiction, and its
progeny to mean that jurisdiction by California courts over a nonresident
defendant is allowed if the defendant has enough continuous contacts with
California to subject that defendant to general jurisdiction5 in the state.
General jurisdiction flows from a non-resident defendant's
continuous, systematic business contacts with [a particular
forum-state].... In such circumstances, the non-resident
defendant may be required to submit to the jurisdiction of a
court sitting in this forum even though the pending cause of
action does not arise out of the defendant's forum-related
activities.
1 6
Thus, general jurisdiction is a powerful and wide-reaching jurisdictional
tool for bringing defendants within the jurisdiction of a particular forum
state's courts, assuming the defendants have sufficiently broad-based
contacts in that state.
On the other hand, if the specific cause of action in question arises out
of a defendant's more limited contacts with California, the state may exer-
exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants.") (citing Complaint of Damodar Bulk
Carriers, 903 F.2d 675, 679 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990)).
11. FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 1987); Haisten v.
Grass Valley Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392, 1396 (9th Cir. 1986). "De
novo" is defined as "[a]new; afresh; a second time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 435 (6th ed.
1990).
12. Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).
13. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1977).
14. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
15. "General jurisdiction" is jurisdiction "[s]uch as extends to all controversies that may be
brought before a court within the legal bounds of rights and remedies . .. ." BLACK'S LAW
DIc'IoNARY 684 (6th ed. 1990).
16. Van Steenwyk v. Interamerican Management Consulting Corp., 834 F. Supp. 336, 339
(E.D. Wash. 1993) (citations omitted).
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cise limited or specific jurisdiction17 over the defendant.' 8  Succinctly
stated, "[s]pecific jurisdiction exists, ... when a court agrees to entertain
a cause of action which does arise from forum-related activities."19
Specific jurisdiction, however, "may be asserted only when the non-resident
defendant has had 'fair warning' that its activities in [a particular forum
state] may subject it to the jurisdiction of courts in [that] forum."
Specific jurisdiction is therefore narrower and more circumscribed in appli-
cability than general jurisdiction in that the underlying cause of action by
the plaintiff must be related to the defendant's contacts in the forum state.
C. The Personal Jurisdiction Analysis
To address questions regarding personal jurisdiction over non-residents
of the state in which the proceedings occur, a federal court borrows the
long-arm statute of the forum state in which it sits, just as if the courts of
the forum state were addressing the same question.2' As with other
constitutionally protected areas, states must comply with the minimum
federal due process standards announced by the United States Supreme
Court. Of course, states may also insist on even greater protections for
potential defendants. However, "[t]he California long-arm statute provides
that jurisdiction may be exercised over non-resident defendants 'on any
basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United
States."'" California's long-arm statute thus utilizes the same jurisdiction
standard as federal due process demands, and its personal jurisdiction
analysis is the same as the federal standard.23 To that end, "[t]he due
process clause prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants unless those defendants have 'minimum contacts' with the forum
state so that the exercise of jurisdiction 'does not offend traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice."'24
17. "Limited" or "special" (specific) jurisdiction is "[]urisdiction... which is confined to
particular types of cases or actions, or which can be exercised only under the limitations and
circumstances prescribed by the statute." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990).
18. See Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Data Disc v.
Systems Technology Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977)).
19. Il (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,414 n.8 (1984)).
20. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
21. Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 105 (1987).
22. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc.
Code § 410.10 (Deerings 1991)).
23. Id. at 620 (quoting FDIC v. British-American Ins., 828 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir.
(1987)).
24. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945)).
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Historically, presence in a particular forum state served as the criterion
for asserting personal jurisdiction over any defendant, whether or not a
resident of the forum state.' "Minimum contacts" then developed as a
proper basis for asserting personal jurisdiction "as a substitute for' a
defendant's actual presence in a forum state," for situations in which the
defendant was not physically present in the forum state.' Although the
concept is rather amorphous, minimum contacts are "those activities ...
within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the
demands of due process."'27 The "fair play and substantial justice"
standard, on the other hand, refers to tradition-based concepts of fairness
regarding the assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident. Tied
inextricably to the concept of minimum contacts,28 this second standard
also "developed by analogy to 'physical presence."' 29 In other words,
particularly in light of interstate and international commerce, the need
developed for a means of asserting personal jurisdiction over those doing
business in particular fora without necessarily requiring their physical
presence.
Today, however, a personal jurisdiction analysis is much more
complicated. Courts bifurcate the analysis of personal jurisdiction into both
a "minimum contacts" test as well as a "fair play and substantial justice"
test, treating the two tests together as one analysis with two separate,
mutually exclusive inquiries.' This bifurcation stems from dicta in the
landmark case Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz.3'
Burger King involved an alleged breach of contract by defendant
Rudzewicz and his partner, two Michigan-based franchisees of the plaintiff,
Burger King, a Florida-based corporation. Burger King brought suit for
breach of contract seeking damages and injunctive relief from the
25. See Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 610 (1990) ("Among the firmly established
principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition is that the courts of a State have
jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the State."); see also Grace v. Mac-
Arthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (defendant was within the "territorial limits" of
the forum state when served with a summons, and the defendant's motion to quash was properly
denied).
26. Lee, supra note 6, at 947 (citation omitted).
27. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945).
28. See Hylwa v. Palka, 823 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1987) (court dismissed complaint against
defendant because he did.not have minimum contacts which would be sufficient to satisfy
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); see also MGM Grand, Inc. v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct. of Nev., 807 P.2d 201 (Nev. 1991).
29. Burnham v. Superior Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990).
30. Lee, supra note 6, at 948.
31. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). The groundwork for this dicta first appeared in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1979). See Lee, supra note 6, at 949.
666 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 15
defendants. The federal district court in Florida held that the franchisees
were subject to personal jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm statute, and
after trial on the merits, entered a judgment against the defendants. The
court of appeals reversed,32 but was then in turn reversed by the United
States Supreme Court.33
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan introduced and relied heavily
upon the concept of foreseeability:
[W]e have emphasized the need for a "highly realistic" approach
that recognizes that a "contract" is "ordinarily but an inter-
mediate step serving to tie up prior business negotiations with
future consequences which themselves are the real object of the
business transaction." It is these factors - prior negotiations
and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of
the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing - that
must be evaluated in determining whether the defendant
purposefully established minimum contacts within the forum.34
The United States circuit courts of appeals ultimately adopted the
Burger King dicta concerning the bifurcated analysis for personal
jurisdiction as law, but the various circuits do not apply the analysis
uniformly.35 Most circuits follow the bifurcated analysis for personal
jurisdiction set out in Burger King, but a few, including the Ninth,
developed complex, multi-factored tests for personal jurisdiction.
The Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have created tests for
personal jurisdiction that can be categorized under the rubric of
the "multi-factor balancing test." This type of test weighs a
number of factors to determine whether the plaintiff's choice of
forum or the defendant's due process rights should prevail.
Although the factors in these circuits' balancing tests vary to
some degree, the effect of the courts' reliance on the Burger
King factors is the same. That is, the Burger King factors
compound the minimum contacts inquiry without making the
circuit courts' personal jurisdiction analyses any more determi-
native or "fair.
' 36
32. Burger King Corp. v. MacShara, 724 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1984).
33. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471 (1985).
34. Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
35. Lee, supra note 6, at 953.
36. Id. at 955.
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D. Specific, Personal Jurisdiction: The Ninth Circuit's
Multi-Factored, Three-Part Test
The Ninth Circuit has formulated a three-part test for determining the
courts' powers to exercise specific, personal jurisdiction: "1) the nonresi-
dent defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum by some affirmative act or conduct; 2)
plaintiff's claim must arise out of or result from the defendant's forum-
related activities; and 3) exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable."
37
1. Purposeful Availment
A defendant satisfies the purposeful availment prong when he or she
"perform[s] some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the
transaction of business within the forum state."38  As "[t]he Supreme
Court has explained: 'This purposeful availment requirement ensures that
a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of
random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts, or of the unilateral activity of
another party or third person."' 39  Moreover, "'[t]he smaller the element
of purposeful interjection, the less is jurisdiction to be anticipated and the
less reasonable is its exercise."'" In other words, a defendant must
somehow gain the benefits or protections of the laws of the forum state.
Most commonly, the benefits and protections of state laws are extended to
those seeking to enjoy the privilege of conducting business in a particular
forum state.4 ' Such benefits or protections must also stem from the
37. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 620-21 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1990)); see also Haisten v. Grass Valley
Medical Reimbursement Fund, Ltd., 784 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1986). Specifically, the court in
Haisten required:
1. The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction
within the forum. . . . by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of
its laws. 2. The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the
defendant's forum-related activities. 3. Exercise ofjurisdiction must be reasonable.
784 F.2d at 1397.
38. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Eastern
Onion Coop. Corp. v. Eastern Onion of Houston, Inc. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21435 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 30, 1992).
39. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985)).
40. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus., 11 F.3d 1482, 1488 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1271 (9th Cir. 1981)).
41. See Hoag v. Sweetwater Int'l, 857 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (D. Nev. 1994) (where defendant
expected to enjoy the benefits of conducting business in the forum state, and executed a lease and
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minimum contacts requirements of International Shoe.42 As such, there
are "omnipresent" cases in which district courts must rule on the suffi-
ciency of non-residents' contacts with the forum.43
Arguably, it might seem fair that if a non-resident of a particular
forum state makes a contract with a resident of that forum, the transaction
should automatically bring the non-resident under the personal jurisdiction
of that state. In such a case, the non-resident would probably turn to that
state's courts for protection should the other party breach or otherwise
injure him. Thus, by the transaction itself, the non-resident is attempting
to gain the benefits and protections of the laws of that particular state.
"[H]owever, Burger King specifically noted that the existence of a contract
with a resident of the forum state is insufficient by itself to create personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident."' 4 Instead, the Court opined that "with
respect to interstate contractual obligations, we have emphasized that parties
who 'reach out beyond one state and create continuing relationships and
obligations with citizens of another state' are subject to regulation and
sanctions in the other State for the consequences of their activities." 5
The standard used to assess purposeful availment in a contract-based
action is of course far different than the standard used in a tort case.
46
Contracts, by their very nature, may implicate the benefits and protections
of the law of a particular forum. Therefore, purposeful availment in the
contract setting requires the analysis of additional factors, such as "'prior
purchase agreements with the plaintiff, the defendant created "continuing contractual relationships
and obligations that were subject to the benefits and protections of Nevada law.").
42. Johannsen v. Brown, 788 F. Supp. 465, 468 (D. Or. 1992) (where the defendant should
have foreseen that any infringement of the plaintiffs copyright would have injured him in the
forum where the plaintiff brought suit, purposeful interjection is sufficient to lead to personal
jurisdiction).
43. David A. Gerber, Copyright Law Update, at 153 (PLI/Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks
and Literary Property Practice Course Handbook Series No. G4-3917, 1994) (citing Johannsen
v. Brown, 788 F. Supp. 465 (D. Or. 1992) (where personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state
magazine was created by correspondence with the plaintiff-artist)); see also Rano v. Sipa Press,
Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1990) (addressing personal jurisdiction over a genuinely "foreign"
defendant, i.e., a potential defendant living in another country).
44. Roth, 942 F.2d at 621.
45. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 473 (1985) (emphasis added) (quoting
Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950)).
46. Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1520, 1519 (D. Or. 1992).
Contract cases are different than a typical tort case regarding purposeful availment because "in
a tort case... 'within the rubric of 'purposeful availment' the Court has allowed the exercise of
jurisdiction over a defendant whose only 'contact' with the forum state is the 'purposeful
direction' of a foreign act having effect in the forum state."' Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Roth,
942 F.2d at 621).
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negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms
of the contract and the parties' actual course of dealing."' 47
2. "Arising Out Of' or "Resulting From"
To satisfy the second prong of "arising out of' or "resulting from,"
a defendant, at a minimum, must perform some affirmative act which
produces a result or effect in the forum state.48 This requirement does
seem to guarantee that, at least in some way, a defendant has sufficient
contacts with the forum state such that the forum state has a legitimate
interest in seeing the matter litigated in the state's own court system.
Realistically, however, "arising out of' and "resulting from" are both
ambiguous, and serve as potentially manipulable standards, allowing courts
to hear the merits of a particular case, if it so desires.
3. Reasonableness
Reasonableness is the third prong, and it is assessed via a multi-
factored test. Analyzing these factors when determining "reasonableness"
is in actuality a "balancing test within another balancing test., 49 Osten-
sibly, the additional balancing meets International Shoe's proscription
against jurisdiction offensive to traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.
As developed in Sinatra, and painstakingly analyzed in Roth, the
reasonableness inquiry is comprised of the seven following factors:
1) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the
forum state's affairs; 2) the burden on the defendant; 3) conflicts
of law between the forum and defendant's home jurisdiction; 4)
the forum's interest in adjudicating the dispute; 5) the most
efficient judicial resolution of the dispute; 6) the plaintiff's
interest in convenient and effective relief; and 7) the existence
of an alternative forum.
50
None of these factors are completely dispositive and they must be balanced,
that is, weighed against each other in an effort to reach a fair and equitable
result.5 No factor is weighted more heavily than any other, however, and
47. Van Steenwyk v. Interamerican Management Consulting Corp., 834 F. Supp. 336, 340
(E.D. Wash. 1993) (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985)).
48. See Mirotznick v. Sensney, Davis & McCormick, 658 F. Supp. 932 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
49. Lee, supra note 6, at 955.
50. Roth, 942 F.2d at 623 (citations omitted).
51. FDIC v. British-American Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1442 (9th Cir. 1987).
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courts are left to wrestle with the seven factors and their own sense of
fairness.
4. The Analysis Analyzed
The Ninth Circuit's test is "substantially more complicated 5 2 than
that required under Burger King. This three-prong test is conducted on two
levels, and as stated earlier, it is actually a "balancing test within another
balancing test. ' 53 The "inner" balancing test weighs the seven "reason-
ableness factors." However, as with the Sixth Circuit's similar test, the
reasonableness prong is not allowed to have an overly influential role in the
overall "reasonableness" determination of personal jurisdiction inquiries.'
[Oince a court establishes that a defendant purposefully availed
himself of the benefits of the forum state and that the defend-
ant's forum-related activities gave rise to the cause of action, the
forum's exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively reasonable.
Therefore, the burden shifts to the defendant to demonstrate why
an exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.55
Ill. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF ROTH AND RANO
As evidenced by the nature of the Ninth Circuit's three-part test,
personal jurisdiction inquiries are highly fact-specific determinations. As
such, a careful review of the facts in both Roth and Rano is required so the
results of both cases can be understood, compared, and reconciled.
A. Roth v. Garcia Marquez
1. Procedural Posture
The controversy in Roth centered on Richard Roth's and Richard Roth
Production's ("Roth's") attempt to secure the movie rights to Gabriel
Garcia Marquez's novel Love in the Time of Cholera ("Cholera").56 In
1989, Roth filed a complaint in the Central District of California seeking
declaratory relief to determine his rights to produce Cholera. Garcia
52. Lee, supra note 6, at 955.
53. Id at 955.
54. kd at 956.
55. Il at 957 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Roth, 942 F.2d at 625.
56. Roth, 942 F.2d at 618.
57. Id. at 620.
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Marquez and his agent Carmen Balcells filed a motion to dismiss, alleging,
inter alia, that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over them.58
The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, but it granted their motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, and also denied Roth's motion for leave to amend his
complaint.59 Roth appealed the district court's dismissal of his complaint
for failure to state a claim, while Garcia Marquez and Balcells appealed the
district court's denial of their motion to dismiss for want of personal
jurisdiction.'
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
district court's finding that personal jurisdiction existed as to Garcia
Marquez and Balcells.61 The court also affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, as well as the denial of leave to
amend the complaint.62
2. Factual Summary
Richard Roth is a movie producer who lives and works in California.
His company, Richard Roth Productions, is a California corporation, doing
business in the state of California. Gabriel Garcia Marquez is an
internationally renowned author who won the Nobel Prize for Literature in
1982. He has written many best-selling novels, and the film rights to his
book Love in the Time of Cholera were at issue in this case.63 Garcia
Marquez was a sixteen-year resident of Mexico City, and his agent,
Balcells, the president of a literary agency in Barcelona, Spain, who also
resided in Spain.6'
In the latter half of 1986, Roth contacted Garcia Marquez in Mexico
City. Roth wanted to make Cholera into a movie. After meeting Roth in
Havana, Cuba, Garcia Marquez said he would consider selling the film
rights under three conditions: Roth would agree (1) to pay him five million
dollars; (2) to use a Latin American director; and (3) to shoot (produce and
direct) the film in Colombia. 65 To finalize and secure the deal, Garcia
Marquez authorized Balcells to pursue further negotiations with Roth.66
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Roth, 942 F.2d at 629.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 619.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619.
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Negotiations dragged on because of various disputes, ranging from the
price Roth could pay for an option on the film rights, to the identity of a
possible director.67 Roth travelled repeatedly to Barcelona and Mexico
City to meet with both agent and author, while calls, letters and faxes
passed among all three parties."8 The only meetings in the United States
occurred when Balcells visited the country for an annual convention and
took some time out to meet with Roth, and when Garcia Marquez was
visiting a friend in Los Angeles for four days and met with Roth.
Eventually, Garcia Marquez dropped his insistence on shooting the film in
Colombia and agreed that Roth could shoot the film in Brazil instead;
however, he remained firm on the two other terms.69
On November 17, 1988, Roth, through his agent, purchased the grant
of an option to the right to produce Cholera, as well as the right to extend
the option. Along with the option purchase, Roth included a letter which
was signed by him as well as his agent, and later by Balcells which
confirmed all the details of the proposed deal. The letter also confirmed
that a "final agreement" had been reached and that there was a great deal
of excitement that all those involved could "finally ... get this project
moving."70 In late February, 1989, when Roth's agent finally transmitted
the formal agreement to Balcells, Balcells objected to a number of items in
the agreement, including the omission of clauses about a Latin American
director and the site of the shooting.71 Balcells communicated these
objections to Roth, and after weeks of renewed negotiations, the parties
could not reach an accord. Garcia Marquez never signed a formal
agreement and Roth never paid him any money.
72
For its personal jurisdiction analysis, the Roth court provided this
summary:
Garcia Marquez lives in Mexico City and has never resided in
California. He has visited the state four times for a total of
twenty days. He met with Roth once in California, but entered
the state for a social purpose. He has never owned property in
the state, nor has he ever conducted business on a regular basis
or authorized any resident of the state to do so on his behalf.
He has maintained a checking account, not his principal one, in
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Roth, 942 F.2d at 619-20.
72. Id. at 620.
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Los Angeles since 1988 for the purposes. [sic] of having an
account in dollars for certain transactions occurring outside of
California.
Balcells lives in Barcelona. She has never lived in
California, though she has visited twice. On one of those
occasions, she met with Roth, though she was in the state for a
convention. She has never owned property in California, has no
office or telephone number there, and has never conducted
business on a regular basis or authorized any resident of the
state to do so for her.73
Despite the negative factual findings inherent in the record, findings that
ordinarily would militate against holding a defendant properly subject to
personal jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district
court's finding of personal jurisdiction over both defendants.74
B. Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc.
1. Procedural Posture
Unlike Roth, Rano involved the issue of copyright infringement.
Plaintiff Kip Rano, a photographer, sued Sipa Press, Sipa Press, Inc., Sipa,
Inc. (a photograph distribution syndicate, all hereinafter "Sipa"), and
Goskin Sipahioglu, President and one of three owners of Sipa Press. Rano
filed suit in federal district court for copyright infringement and improper
copyright notice, as well as pendent state claims for breach of contract,
intentional interference with economic relationships, and malicious
conversion.75
The "district court dismissed Rano's pendent claims for malicious
conversion and intentional interference with economic relationship and
granted defendant Sipahioglu's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction." '76 After a hearing on the merits, the district court granted
defendant Sipa's motion for summary judgment, holding that all but one of
Rano's infringement claims did not constitute copyright claims under the
Copyright Act and that the one remaining claim was meritless.7 The
73. Id. at 620.
74. Id. at 629. For a complete discussion of the circuit's holding and accompanying
rationale, see Part III.C., infra.
75. Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1993).
76. l at 583.
77. l at 583-84.
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district court then dismissed the remaining pendent state claims for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction."
The United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, affirmed the
district court's dismissal of defendant Goskin Sipahioglu for lack of
personal jurisdiction.7 9  The court also affirmed the district court's
summary judgment in favor of Sipa on the issue of copyright infringe-
ment. o However, the circuit court reversed the district court's summary
judgment in favor of Sipa regarding Rano's claim for improper copyright
notice, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's
opinion.8
2. Factual Summary
During or before 1978, Rano and representatives of the defendants
met in France and entered into an oral agreement by which Rano granted
Sipa a non-exclusive license of unspecified duration to reproduce,
distribute, and sell his photographs, as well as to authorize other licensees
to also reproduce, distribute and sell Rano's photographs.82 Sipa, in
return, agreed to store and develop Rano's negatives and pay a fifty percent
royalty on the revenue generated from the sales and distribution of Rano's
photographs.83
The relationship between the parties proceeded smoothly and without
interruption for approximately eight years, and Rano eventually gave Sipa
several thousand photographs for distribution.' However, in March,
1986, Rano notified Sipa that he would no longer be sending negatives to
Sipa because he was changing agencies. Rano cited "Sipa's failure to
timely pay royalties, low sales, poor photography assignments, and [Sipa's]
unwillingness to reimburse" some expenses as reasons for the change.
85
78. Id at 584.
79. Id at 588.
80. Rano, 987 F.2d at 589.
81. Id
82. Id. at 583. When the parties entered the agreement, Sipa had offices in France, Delaware
and New York. Goskin Sipahioglu, sued individually, resided in France, and was a citizen of
Turkey. The Rano opinion, however, does not make clear in its factual "Overview" whether
Rano, a citizen of Great Britain with his principal place of business in California, had any
contacts in California at the time he signed the agreement. See id. at 583. Later in the opinion,
the court tacitly found that Rano did in fact come to California after the agreement's formation,
stating: "Sipahioglu could not have foreseen Rano's fortuitous move from Europe to California."
Id at 588.
83. Rano, 987 F.2d at 583.
84. id.
85. Id.
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On March 12, 1987, Rano informed Sipahioglu that he "did not authorize
Sipa to sell any more of [his] photographs." 6
Finally, in July of 1989, Rano sued the defendants for allegedly
infringing his copyright by: (1) failing to credit him for a photograph; (2)
failing to pay certain royalties; (3) continuing to distribute some of Rano's
photographs after he demanded their return and terminated the licensing
agreement with Sipa; (4) failing to return some of his photographs; and (5)
placing defective copyright notices on slide mounts of some of Rano's
photographs.8 7 Rano also alleged breach of contract, intentional inter-
ference with economic relations, and malicious conversion claims against
the defendants.88 The plaintiff sought an injunction against Sipa's further
use of his photographs as a remedy for the copyright claims. He also
sought delivery of any photographs still in Sipa's possession for impound-
ment, a declaratory judgment detailing his rights to his photographs,
compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Defendant
Sipahioglu successfully moved to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction. 9
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit made a tri-partite holding.' First,
federal copyright law preempted California's at-will doctrine and rendered
the doctrine inapplicable to a copyright licensing agreement of limitless
duration.9' Second, a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the
adequacy of plaintiff's copyright notice which the licensee used on
negatives, thus precluding summary judgment for the licensee.' Finally,
the circuit court affirmed the district court's holding that it lacked personal
jurisdiction over defendant Sipahioglu, the president of Sipa Press, Inc.9'
C. Analysis of Roth and Rano Under Applicable Law
1. Threshold Issues
Convenient for comparison at the most basic level of inquiry, both
Roth and Rano share the same de novo standard of review on appeal to the
86. Id.
87. l. at 583.
88. Rano, 987 F.2d at 583.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 589.
91. Id. at 585-86.
92. Id. at 587.
93. Rano, 987 F.2d at 588. For a complete discussion of the circuit's holding and
accompanying rationale, see infra part mH.C..
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Ninth Circuit. Further, neither of the respective plaintiffs asserted that the
defendants should be subject to general jurisdiction in California. Instead,
in both Roth and Rano, the question presented was whether the defendants
had sufficient "minimum contacts" in California for specific, personal
jurisdiction.94
2. Purposeful Availment
The Roth and Rano courts took different approaches to analyze
purposeful availment. In Roth, the court conceded that its decision
regarding the purposeful availment prong of the Ninth Circuit's test was a
close one.95 The court acknowledged that even though it eventually found
sufficient contacts by the defendants to support personal jurisdiction, there
were two facts which marginally worked in the defendants' favor: (1)
minimal physical presence in the forum by the defendants; and (2) the
plaintiff himself made the efforts to solicit the defendants outside the
forum,96 referred to in personal jurisdiction parlance as "unilateral acts"
by the plaintiff. Facts such as these ordinarily militate against a finding of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.'
The Roth court, however, did something extraordinary in its analysis;
the court looked to the future consequences of the contract between Roth
and Garcia Marquez in a unique way. Drawing on Burger King's concept
of the "contemplated future consequences" of a contract, as well as Burger
King's reliance on the express terms of a contract and the parties' history
regarding their course of dealings, the court decided to look to the realm
of possibilities.98 "[WIhen a contract is offered as the basis of personal
jurisdiction, a court must examine the 'economic reality' embodied in the
agreement.
' 99
Specifically, the Roth decision turned on the fact that this case
involved a potential motion picture. At length, the court observed:
the contract concerned a film, most of the work for which would
have been performed in California. Though the shooting most
94. Cf. Zenger-Miller, Inc. v. Training Team GMBH, 757 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(German defendants unable to contend that their lack of minimum contacts in California left the
state unable to assert personal jurisdiction over them because the defendants consented to personal
jurisdiction contractually via a forum selection clause).
95. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (9th Cir. 1991).
96. Il
97. See iL
98. Id. (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985)).
99. Van Steenwyk v. Interamerican Management Consulting Corp., 834 F. Supp. 336, 342
(quoting Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 622 (1991)).
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likely would have taken place in Brazil, all of the editing,
production work, and advertising would have occurred in
California. This is not an instance where the contract was a
one-shot deal ... [M]ost of the future of the contract would
have centered on the forum.... In looking at the "economic
reality," it seems that the contract's subject would have contin-
uing and extensive involvement with the forum.'
This line of reasoning should be more than a little unsettling to potential
defendants in that the Roth court did not restrict its analysis to the
defendant's contacts with the forum, but also looked to the possible future
contacts of people who might help fulfill the contract, such as editors,
producers and advertisers.'01 This is particularly problematic because the
court looked at the contract's connection with the forum state. Instead, the
court should have focused only on the defendant's contacts with the forum
in its personal juirisdiction analysis.
On the other hand, in Rano, the plaintiff contended that Sipahioglu
caused and profited from Sipa's grant of licenses of Rano's photographs to
publications that Sipahioglu knew would be distributed in California,
among other places. Thus, Rano argued such a distribution was enough to
satisfy purposeful availment.' 2
The Rano court disagreed. Instead of focusing on the "foreseeable
consequences" of the "economic reality" of the parties' course of dealing,
the court held there was no way that Sipahioglu could have foreseen Rano
moving from Europe to California. 03 Moreover, there was no evidence
presented that Sipahioglu received the benefits or protections of California
law."°  Interestingly, the court noted that if Rano's argument were
accepted, it would render Sipahioglu - and any other foreign owners of
art who sell their works to publications - open to suit in each and every
100. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622 (citation omitted).
101. Lee, supra note 6, at 961.
102. Rano, 987 F.2d at 588.
103. Id. at 588. See also Pacific Ad. Trading Co. v. MV Main Express, 758 F.2d 1325,
1329 (1985) (no basis to assume the foreseeability of a suit in California based on an agreement
signed by the parties in Malaysia).
104. Katherine C. Spelman, Current Developments in Copyright Law, at 191 (PLI/Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No.G4-3917, 1994) ("The
question was whether the fact that a photographer knew or had reason to know that plaintiff's
publication of his photograph would include distribution in California was sufficient to trigger
'long ann' jurisdiction in California. The Court ruled that it was not. No specific jurisdiction
found because defendant had not triggered the protection of California law."). Id. at 191. See
also David Goldberg, et al., Judicial Developments in Literary and Artistic Property, 40 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 511, 512 (1993).
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state into which their art eventually is distributed or displayed.'05 Finally,
the Rano court noted that litigation against an alien defendant presents a
higher barrier to personal jurisdiction than if the defendant were simply
from another state."m Ultimately, the court found that Rano did not carry
his burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over Sipahioglu, and
affirmed the district court's dismissal of claims against him, largely due to
his lack of genuine purposeful availment.' 7
2. "Arising Out Of' or "Resulting From"
As with the purposeful availment prong, the Roth and Rano courts
took different approaches to the second prong as well, and likewise reached
dissimilar conclusions. In Roth, the court held that there was "no dispute"
on the second prong, and that the plaintiff's suit arose directly from the
defendants' activities directed at the forum. The court relied on the fact
that the "appellees concede that appellant's claim arises out of the January
19 letter, which was negotiated and executed by a party who was in the
forum at the time, namely Roth in Los Angeles."' '
By contrast, in Rano, the plaintiff relied on the same argument to
prove the second prong that he used in asserting that the purposeful
availment prong was satisfied; that Sipa's knowledge of the distribution of
plaintiff's photographs to California publications sufficiently met both the
"purposeful availment" and "arising out of requirements."'" Again, the
court in Rano disagreed with the plaintiff's contentions, relying on the
same rationale to dismiss this argument for the fulfillment of the "arising
105. Rano, 987 F.2d at 588.
106. Id. See also Pacific Ad. Trading Co., 758 F.2d at 1330 ("Foreign-acts-with-forum-
effects jurisdictional principle 'must be applied with caution, particularly in an international
context."') (quoting Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628 F.2d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1062, (1980) (quoting Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,
468 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2nd Cir. 1972))).
107. See generally Photo Licensing Agreement Not Terminable At Will, 10 CoMPUTER LAW.
31 (1993). This is also consistent with a large body of case law which holds that:
Jurisdiction over an individual director or officer of a corporation may not be
predicated on the court's jurisdiction over the corporation itself, unless the
individual himself maintains contacts with the forum state that would subject him
to the coverage of the state's long arm statute and comport with due process.
Hoag v. Sweetwater Int'l, 857 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (1994) (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783,
790 (1984)).
108. Roth, 942 F.2d at 622.
109. See Rano, 987 F.2d at 588 ("Rano contends that Sipahioglu caused and profited from
Sipa's grant of licenses of Rano's photographs to magazine publications that he knew would be
distributed in California. This is enough, Rano argues, to satisfy the 'purposeful availment' and
'arising out of requirements ....").
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out of' requirement that it had used to defeat the argument made regarding
the defendant's purposeful availment: a fortuitous move by Rano to
California, not foreseeable by the defendants, as well as the fact that the
defendants did not receive the benefits and protections of California law,
demonstrated the insufficiency of the Rano's argument."1
3. Reasonableness
Unfortunately, while the Roth court reached the third prong's
reasonableness analysis, the Rano court did not. The Roth court carefully
weighed and balanced the seven "reasonableness" factors."' Two factors
favored Roth, three favored the defendants, and two were basically
neutral. 2 This created an "extremely close question," and the court
indicated that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in
this case might in fact be unreasonable based on the assessment of the
seven reasonableness factors." 3  As the court noted, however, the
difficulty for the defendants was that "'[o]nce purposeful availment has
been established, the forum's exercise of jurisdiction is presumptively
reasonable. To rebut that presumption, a defendant 'must present a
compelling case' that the exercise of jurisdiction would, in fact, be
unreasonable.', 11 4  This need for a "compelling" case could not be
overcome by the defendants. Thus, the court concluded that while the
defendants "may be able to show that the exercise of jurisdiction might be
unreasonable,... the closeness of the question manifests that they cannot
do so in a compelling fashion."
'" 5
At least one commentator has correctly pointed out that this aspect of
the Roth decision shows that using these seven balancing factors often
110. See supra notes 82, 102-103 and text accompanying notes 102-103.
111. See supra, note 50 and accompanying text.
112. The court's balancing of the reasonableness factors looked like this: Garcia Marquez
and Balcells "narrowly ... purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting
activities in California," and granting Roth convenient and effective redress also favored Roth,
although "not as decisively as in other cases." Roth, 942 F.2d at 623-24. Meanwhile, burdens
on the defendant, conflicts with the sovereignty of two foreign nations, and the availability of an
alternative forum favored the defendants. Finally, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
issue and the most efficient forum for judicial resolution of the conflict favored neither party.
Id.
113. "Garcia Marquez and Balcells, [the defendants]... can make a strong argument on the
third prong, namely that the exercise of jurisdiction may be unreasonable." Roth, 942 F.2d at
625.
114. Id. (quoting Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 386 (9th Cir. 1990)).
115. Id.
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provides no clear result." 6 Moreover, the factors do not make a personal
jurisdiction analysis any more fair to individual defendants. The standard
used in Roth merely obscures the search for what should be the true issue
in every personal jurisdiction case: whether the defendant's due process
rights are violated by a particular court asserting personal jurisdiction over
his or her person."7 In Roth, the defendant made a strong argument
against the state's exercise of personal jurisdiction, but this argument could
not overcome the burden imposed by the "presumption of reasonableness"
doctrine applied by the court."' Obviously, this "balancing within a
balancing" test can be awkward and unpredictable." 9 The difficulties
associated with the Ninth Circuits test are especially problematic because,
as in Roth, a court might conclude that a particular defendant made a strong
showing of unreasonableness which should, in and of itself, be enough for
a defendant to defeat personal jurisdiction. After all, it is a defendant's due
process rights which are implicated in personal jurisdiction analysis.
However, in Roth, the defendants were held to a higher standard of
"unreasonableness," a standard which could not be overcome, thus
abridging Roth's and Balcell's due process rights. For this reason, Roth
itself has been a lightning rod of criticism, illustrating the deleterious effect
of the Ninth Circuit's test for personal jurisdiction on both fairness and
predictability.
120
Unlike Roth, the court in Rano never reached the third prong of
reasonableness. Without a showing on either of the first two prongs, it
proved unnecessary. Therefore, reasonableness is technically an impossible
point of comparison between the two cases. Had reasonableness been
considered, however, it probably would have ultimately cut in favor of Sipa
and the other defendants. For example, an inquiry into the first factor of
the reasonableness analysis, purposeful interjection, parallels the question
of minimum contacts.12 1 The Rano court clearly decided that Sipa's
contacts were insufficient to grant personal jurisdiction to the satisfaction
of the purposeful availment requirement of the circuit's test. Secondly, had
the Rano court considered the second reasonableness factor, the burden of
defending a suit in a foreign land, "Itlhe unique burdens placed upon one
who must defend oneself in a foreign legal system should have significant
116. Lee, supra note 6, at 960-61.
117. Id.
118. Id
119. Id at 957.
120. Id
121. Sinatra v. National Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1199 (9th Cir. 1988).
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weight in assessing ... reasonableness."'" The record failed to disclose
that Sipa had even a single office in California, nor in the rest of the
United States for that matter. In addition, all potential witnesses and
evidence remained outside of California. All such considerations pointed
to the "considerable burden" on the defendant."z
The remaining reasonableness factors almost all seemed to militate
against the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Sipahioglu. Undoubtedly,
there would be conflicts of law between the United States and both of
Sipahioglu's "home countries," Turkey and France. Next, California would
not benefit by trying the case, and neither the state, nor its citizens, would
probably have much of an interest in adjudicating the dispute. Further,
California would not afford the most efficient forum for judicial resolution
in that no witnesses or evidence would be present in the state, and holding
the trial there would prove a hardship on the defendant, a resident of
France. The plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief is perhaps
the worst argument for unreasonableness as it seems to cut in favor of
Rano's having the case heard in California. 24 However, in light of the
fact that alternative fora exist, and that the other five factors favor
Sipahioglu, it seems that California's assertion of personal jurisdiction over
Sipahioglu would be unreasonable.
IV. RECONCILING ROTH WITH RANO
Once the applicable law and facts are set out, the puzzle over the
Ninth Circuit's conflicting holdings grows more readily apparent.
Reconciling the disparate results should either harmonize the law regarding
personal jurisdiction, or, should point to the fact that Roth and Rano are
hopelessly at odds with each other.
122. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
123. Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis Navigation Co., 1 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Roth, 942 F.2d at 623). Incredibly, Amoco Egypt Oil quotes Roth as precedent.
Although Roth noted the difficulty on the defendant in that case, it did not prove dispositive
regarding the determination of undue burdens. Yet the decision in Amoco Egypt Oil found the
burdens of defending in a foreign legal system undue, and thus held personal jurisdiction
unreasonable.
124. It should go without saying that Rano's desire to sue in California, his new home,
would be a convenient forum. This is evidenced by the fact that Rano chose to file suit in
California.
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A. The Plaintiffs' Arguments
1. Foreseeability
The court in Roth appears to have primarily relied on the concept of
foreseeability in a manner inconsistent with International Shoe and its
progeny in order to craft a decision based on a distorted view of the reality
of the motion picture industry."n
Indeed, the court's assumptions about where the film industry is
based and how the industry operates lay at the heart of its
finding that it could assert personal jurisdiction over Garcia
Marquez and Balcells.... The true message of Roth is that the
Ninth Circuit still views Hollywood as a geographic place, even
though modem day film-makers recognize that Hollywood is
really more a term describing a global state of mind.'2 6
The Roth court overly minimized the significant fact that Cholera was to
be filmed in Brazil, not Hollywood. Furthermore, that the court seemed so
certain about the future work to be done on Cholera, relying on both
assumptions and facts not before the court or in the parties' briefs, the court
belied a "certain naivete about how the modem motion picture business
works."'27
By contrast, the court in Rano refused to acknowledge Rano's
argument that suit in California was a foreseeable by-product of his and the
defendants' business dealings. As the court succinctly stated: "Sipahioglu
could not have foreseen Rano's fortuitous move from Europe to Califor-
nia."'128 For support, the Rano court cited Pacific Atlantic Trading Co.
v. A/V Main Express,'29 where there was no basis to assume foresee-
ability in California based on an agreement signed in Malaysia. As stated
earlier, such an argument, if accepted, would subject any foreign art owners
125. Daniels, supra note 3, at 367. "The personal jurisdiction holding of Roth is based on
erroneous assumptions of how the motion picture business works." Id. at 354. "The future
consequences analysis and the 'to be made in Hollywood' assumption are what led the Roth court
astray." Id. at 379.
126. Id- at 367 (citation omitted).
127. Id. at 371.
128. Rano, 987 F.2d at 588. See also Ortiz v. Wilmington Trust Co., No. Civ. No. 91-
00573-DAE, 1992 WL 474579, at *3 (D. Haw. June 2, 1992) ("The mere fact that Ortiz [the
plaintiff] ended up in Hawaii after his alleged injury is not sufficient to justify an exercise of
specific jurisdiction over the defendants.").
129. 758 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1985).
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who sell their products to publications in the United States to personal
jurisdiction in each and every state in which their art is eventually
displayed or sold.
131
The Rano decision appeared to be colored by the logic of World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson.'31  In World-Wide Volkswagen, the
Supreme Court refused to hold that a Volkswagen dealership had sufficient
contacts for personal jurisdiction purposes with states outside of the tri-state
area of Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, except for the possible
"contact" created when the plaintiff drove the car he purchased from that
dealership to Oklahoma. The Court held that this was not enough to create
the requisite minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction because the logic
of such an argument, if extended, would render the Volkswagen dealership
amenable to personal jurisdiction in California, Alaska, or even Hawaii,
although the dealership had nothing to do with their product's interjection
into those fora. Such a rule would lead to the situation where "[e]very
seller of chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his agent for service of
process. His amenability to suit would travel with the chattel." '132 The
Court explained:
This is not to say, of course, that foreseability is wholly
irrelevant. But the foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a product will find its
way into the forum State. Rather, it is that the defendant's
conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.133
The finding in Rano should have been different if the chattels in
question, namely photographs, were viewed strictly as chattels distributed
with the intention of finding their way to particular states, such as
California. Such a reading of the facts would be supported by Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court.34 However, it would have been short-
sighted in that such a holding could not ignore the fact that Rano hinged
upon not only the distribution of photographs, but also turned upon the
contract forged between plaintiff and defendant. Coincidentally, the same
analytical duality is manifest in Roth as well.
130. Rano, 987 F.2d at 588.
131. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
132. Id. at 296.
133. Id. at 297.
134. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The awareness on the part of a foreign defendant-manufacturer
of stems for tire valves that its product would reach the forum state via the stream of commerce
constituted the minimal contacts required between the defendant and the forum state for the fair
and just exercise of personal jurisdiction by the forum.
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To that end, both Rano and Roth must really be assessed in light of
Burger King v. Rudzewicz.135 In Burger King, the wisdom of the Court's
logic was apparent. By signing a contractual franchise agreement, the
defendants established a continuous and systematic business relationship
which was pre-set for twenty years.1 36 As franchisees, the defendants
knew that they were establishing a symbiotic business relationship with
very close ties to their corporate giant parent in Florida. Under the
relationship between defendants and Burger King, whereby the defendants
regularly received training and support in exchange for franchise fees and
monthly percentages of the restaurant's profits. This was evidence of the
strength of the parties' established, long-term, interactive relationship.
Moreover, the contract's express terms dictated that all of Burger King's
operations were conducted and supervised from the Florida headquarters.
Specific provisions deemed the agreement to be "made and entered into in
the State of Florida and ... governed and construed under and in
accordance with the laws of the State of Florida."' 37  In sum, the
defendants knew they were dependant franchisees, that their franchisor
lived in a different state than where they operated their franchise, and that
they would enjoy regular and continuous business contacts with the
franchisor in Florida, thereby subjecting themselves to personal jurisdiction
in that state.
In a case like Rano, however, the same logic cannot be applied. Rano
did not always live in California, but rather, happened to move there during
the course of an eight-year business relationship with Sipa. To allow
jurisdiction in this case would be akin to allowing Burger King to haul
Rudzewicz and his partner into a court in Texas or some other state simply
because Burger King moved its corporate headquarters. Quite simply, Sipa
could not have known that Rano would move to California nearly a decade
after contracting with him to distribute his photographs. Therefore, the
Burger King rationale could not have controlled in Rano. As should be
obvious, however, the court in Roth clearly stretched the doctrine of
"foreseeable consequences" to ensnare Garcia Marquez and Balcells in its
jurisdiction.
135. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). Interestingly, Burger King was essentially an intellectual property
case as well, involving tortious infringement of its trademarks and service marks. See id. at 468-
69.
136. Id at 467.
137. Id. at 481.
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2. Nonresident-Defendants With Foreign-National Status
In both Roth and Rano, the plaintiffs argued that they could overcome
the various concerns raised by trying to force a foreign citizen into
American courts. Only in Roth, however, did the Ninth Circuit find
personal jurisdiction proper. The question is why, especially considering
that, when deciding Rano, the circuit court could have drawn on Roth -
a case decided by the Ninth Circuit only two years prior to Rano - for
direct support. Moreover, the Rano court never reached a discussion of
"reasonableness," the circuit's third prong of a successful showing of
personal jurisdiction.
Questions of American jurisdiction over foreign defendants should
certainly be decided under the simple, analytical aegis of reasonableness.
Specifically, however, that simplified reasonableness inquiry should turn on
purposeful availment; if a defendant did not purposefully avail himself of
the benefits and protections of state law, it should be unreasonable to assert
personal jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this is not the status of the law post-
Roth in the Ninth Circuit.
V. THE FUTURE OF PERSONAL JURISDICION
IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
The Ninth Circuit, beyond a doubt, conspicuously ignored its decision
in Roth when deciding Rano. This is puzzling because both were
intellectual property cases involving a resident-plaintiff of California and
a citizen of a foreign country as the nonresident-defendant. These factual
similarities should not necessarily dictate the outcome, but if Roth is still
good law, it is reasonable that it would at least deserve a mention in the
court's analysis in Rano, even if just for the applicable standards of law.
The only possible answer to this oddity is that the Ninth Circuit drew
a distinction when analyzing a case involving photographic licensing versus
a case rooted in the motion picture industry. This uneven approach to
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, however, poses a genuine threat to the
creative personalities abroad who might wish to transact business in the
United States. This threat results in a "chilling effect" which, if creative
personalities are paying attention, could frighten them away from
contractual dealings in California. For example, at least one author has
postulated that:
[A]n aggressive producer has been handed a powerful weapon
by the Roth court. The producer will know that as long as a
bargain is rooted in motion pictures and the agreement is
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sufficient to sustain a motion to dismiss, the Los Angeles-based
business person can haul an artist halfway around the world to
defend that artist's own creation.
138
It can only be speculated upon, and hoped for, that the Roth decision
is now effectively curtailed in force. At the very least, Roth has been
relegated to a possible standard for judging the narrow category of motion
picture cases. Possibly, the Roth holding can be limited to its facts. Or,
perhaps, the decision has been implicitly overruled. This last hypothesis
is probably too optimistic though; after all, the Rano opinion failed to even
mention Roth, let alone overrule it. Finally, there is always the chance that
Roth and Rano were sufficiently different on their facts such that a true
reconciliation of the cases is both impossible and unnecessary.
Due to California's omnipresence in the motion picture industry,
however, the possibility exists that the Ninth Circuit could reconsider the
ill-conceived Roth opinion. If not, the United States Supreme Court awaits
as the final guardian of due process, and an appeal to that Court now seems
to be the only hope of harmonizing the law of personal jurisdiction in the
intellectual property arena. A decision overruling Roth is necessary to
effect this change, and until such a decision comes, the waters of personal
jurisdiction shall remain murky and dangerously navigable for foreign
artists and other creative personalities.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the tension between the disparate decisions of Roth and Rano
is due merely to highly fact-specific scenarios which are necessarily bound
to occur. More troubling, however, is the possibility that the entire edifice
of personal jurisdiction is really much less secure than it appears, and is
ready to fall like the walls of Jerico. 139 If a future litigant can trumpet
loudly enough for the United States Supreme Court to hear, the Court
might step in and harmonize the Burger King dicta which has left the
various circuit courts of appeals to their own designs. One possibility for
the Court to consider is eliminating the use of the Burger King dicta in
order to "compensate for a defendant's lack of minimum contacts" in the
forum state."4 Instead, the focus could return to the due process rights
of the defendant based upon minimum contacts, the only genuine surrogate
for presence in the forum as the means of granting personal jurisdiction.
138. Daniels, supra note 3, at 379.
139. See Joshua, 6:1.
140. Lee, supra note 6, at 967.
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In the Ninth Circuit, special problems exist. In close cases like Roth,
the "pre-set bias towards a presumption of reasonableness [can be]
invoked."'' All too often that bias favors the plaintiff.4  Since the
Ninth Circuit is home to Hollywood, the beacon to the world of arts and
entertainment, California faces the sad, economic reality that foreign,
creative artists and personalties may become much more hesitant before
engaging in business negotiations with anyone in California, even if those
negotiations have only a possible "foreseeable effect" in California. Such
negotiations can now result in the artists being hauled off to court halfway
around the world to defend themselves in a lawsuit - at least in regards
to motion pictures. This result is regrettable because international art,
creative ideas, and entertainment are now threatened at a time of increasing
xenophobia in the United States. This is the last thing which should be
rewarded. The extent to which Rano may have curtailed the power of Roth
as precedent in the Ninth Circuit could make all the difference.
Christopher Lyon'
141. Id. at 965.
142. Id. at 965-66.
* This Comment is dedicated to my family. Thank you for all your love and support.
Thanks also to the staff writers and editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law
Journal for their patience and assistance.
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